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CYBERHARASSMENT AND WORKPLACE LAW
HELEN NORTON

By documenting how cyberharassment can target and injure members of
traditionally subordinated groups, Danielle Keats Citron’s Hate Crimes in
Cyberspace contributes importantly to our understanding of the relationship
between speech and equality. For these reasons, as her opening contribution to
this online symposium makes clear, policymakers and the public are now
starting to rethink their longstanding hands-off approach to the regulation of
online speech that inflicts such harms. Here I very briefly explore what this
might mean for workplace law.
First, Professor Citron’s work and related developments invite us to broaden
our understanding of the universe of actors who shape access to job
opportunities, as well as our understanding of how they can use speech to expand
or constrain those opportunities. Although employment law has traditionally
focused on regulating the relationship between “employers” and their
“employees,” the emergence of Uber, Lyft and other participants in the
“sharing” or “gig” economy demonstrates how those who are hard to fit in
traditional employer/employee categories increasingly control access to work.
In describing the ways in which online harassers can limit their victims’ job
prospects by damaging their online reputation with employers, potential
references, and others, Hate Crimes in Cyberspace similarly encourages us to
reconsider our assumptions about who holds power over important work
opportunities.1
This is not the first time that we have had to rethink our assumptions about
the relationship between speech and the workplace. Recall, for example, the
evolution of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: policymakers in 1964 first chose
to regulate discrimination in employment largely because of its great harm to
families’ economic security as well as to individual dignity and autonomy. Only
decades later did courts, policymakers, and the public come to understand that
illegal discrimination can include harassment, which often (but not always) takes
the form of speech. More specifically, the Supreme Court ratified the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission’s position that employers’ unwelcome
speech (or other workplace behavior) that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to


Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law.
DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 158 (2014) (describing how
cyberharassers “e-mailed damaging statements to [their victim’s] summer employer to
prevent her from receiving a permanent offer; the entire Yale Law faculty, who would serve
as future job recommenders, received e-mails with defamatory lies about her; readers were
urged to contact law firms to talk them out of hiring her”).
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create a hostile work environment can constitute unlawful discrimination by
altering the target’s terms and conditions of employment on the basis of
protected class status.2 In other words, just as compelling workers to endure
miserable working conditions (e.g., assigning them an unforgiving schedule or
a hazardous worksite) on the basis of protected class status alters the terms and
conditions of employment in violation of antidiscrimination law, so too does
creating miserable working conditions by requiring individuals to endure verbal
abuse on the basis of their class status. For these reasons, courts and enforcement
agencies have treated employers’ harassing speech as akin to coercive conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment.3
Although antidiscrimination law now recognizes that employers can drive
women and people of color from the workplace (or can permit coworkers to do
so) through harassing speech, it has yet to acknowledge that nonemployers can
use online speech with the same intent and to the same effect. This suggests the
possibility of expanding civil rights laws to prohibit those other than traditional
employers from constraining job opportunities on the basis of protected class
status. As Professor Citron writes, “Civil rights laws should penalize on-line
harassers who interfere with someone’s right to pursue life’s crucial
opportunities—work, education, and self-expression—due to group bias.”4 To
be sure, our contemporary political climate of polarization and gridlock indicates
that enacting such legislation would be no easy task, at least in the short term.5
But the ongoing conversation itself remains of great value in illuminating our
understanding of the contemporary workplace, its new challenges as well its
opportunities.

2 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
3 See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487 (1993) (referring to Title VII as “an
example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 389 (1992) (“[S]ince words can in some circumstances violate laws directed
not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by
telling the enemy the Nation’s defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a
proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed
at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory ‘fighting words,’
among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII’s general prohibition against sexual
discrimination in employment practices.”) (citations omitted).
4 CITRON, supra note 1, at 142.
5 California may offer a counterexample. Professor Citron describes California law as
permitting “civil penalties for bias-motivated threats or intimidation interfering with
someone’s state or federal statutory or constitutional rights” that include employment and
education, among others. Id. at 154.
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Second, Professor Citron not only proposes new work-related legislation, but
also draws from existing employment law to suggest that employers who rely
on online reputation in screening applicants for hire may violate Title VII’s
prohibition on disparate impact discrimination. More specifically, she proposes
that
[t]he EEOC could and should interpret Title VII to ban employers from
using search engine results as the basis for denying individuals’
employment opportunities. Employers’ reliance on searches to research
candidates has a disparate impact on women given the gendered nature of
cyber harassment. Cyber harassment victims often have difficulty
obtaining and keeping jobs because searches of their names prominently
display the abuse. Employers admittedly rely on social media information
in making hiring and hiring decisions.6
Here the barriers to her proposal are legal rather than political. Recall that
plaintiffs seeking to establish illegal disparate impact discrimination must start
by demonstrating that the challenged practice causes an adverse impact based
on protected class status.7 Even if the plaintiff makes such a showing, employers
can successfully defend the practice by demonstrating that it “is job related for
the position in question and consistent with business necessity.”8 Plaintiffs may
encounter difficulties in establishing, as a threshold statistical matter, that
employers’ use of online search results imposes a disparate impact on the basis
of protected class status. Plaintiffs may also confront challenges in rebutting
employers’ likely assertions that online searches are in fact job-related and
consistent with business necessity in that they may gather information relevant
to employment decisions—e.g., by confirming applicants’ representations on
their resumes.
Despite these legal obstacles, here too there is great value simply in the
conversation that such challenges would provoke, as they might well encourage
employers to think hard about whether online searches are more likely to operate
as discriminatory screens rather than as valuable sorting mechanisms. Indeed, at
its best, disparate impact law encourages employers to reconsider and justify
longstanding but often-underexamined practices. In this way, disparate impact
law seeks both “to identify[] and reward[] individual merit as well as achiev[e]
antisubordination goals[,] . . . ensuring that candidates are selected on actual
merit rather than on unexamined yet entrenched assumptions that replicate
6

Id. at 183.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). For example, applicant flow analysis (a common
means of determining disparate impact) would assess whether online searches result in
statistically significant differences between an employer’s selection rates for male as opposed
to female applicants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (explaining that federal enforcement agencies
will generally consider as evidence of an employment practice’s adverse impact a selection
rate for protected class members that is less than 4/5 of the rate for the group with the highest
selection rate).
8 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
7
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patterns of subordination.”9 To this end, Professor Citron relatedly suggests that
employers who receive training about the phenomenon of cyberharassment
“would be more likely to scrutinize negative information appearing online and
to appreciate its potential peril to traditionally subordinated groups.”10
In short, Professor Citron has cast a spotlight on cyberharassment that
valuably encourages us to consider how law might respond to the emerging ways
in which speech can control and limit access to meaningful work opportunities.

9

Helen Norton, The Supreme Court’s Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 250 (2010); see also id. at 253
(“Disparate impact provisions’ attention to unjustified disparities also substantially enhances
social welfare by improving the practices used to fill key positions.”).
10 CITRON, supra note 1, at 184. For a related suggestion see id. at 184-85 (“Professor
Frank Pasquale has proposed a fair reputation reporting act, which would require employers
to reveal online sources that they use in evaluating applicants. The act would give applicants
a chance to review the digital dossiers compiled about them.”).

